LABOR

LAW-SECTION

7

RIGHTS-EMPLOYER

MUST

ALLOW

UNION STEWARD'S PRESENCE AT INTERVIEW WHERE EMPLOYEE

HAS REASONABLE FEAR OF DISCIPLINE-NLRB v. J. Weingarten,
Inc., 95 S. Ct. 959 (1975); InternationalLadies' Garment Workers'
Union v. Quality Manufacturing Co., 95 S. Ct. 972 (1975).

Catherine King, a long-time employee of Quality Manufacturing Company, raised a commotion on her work floor one afternoon because she felt that her work quota was unreasonable.' When
directed to report to the office of the firm's president to discuss the
disturbance, she complied, but insisted that she be accompanied by
a union representative at the interview. 2 In response, the president demanded that she meet with him alone, as the management
" 'didn't consider it a union matter.'-"3 This impasse culminated in
the discharge of King and of the two union representatives who
4
had attempted to accompany her.
A complaint based, inter alia, on these discharges came before
the National Labor Relations Board.5 The Board, in Quality Manufacturing Co., 6 ruled that the employer's actions constituted an
unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act.7 In so holding, the Board established, as "the
only course consistent with all of the provisions of [the] Act,' ' 8 that
1 Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 205 (1972) (Trial Examiner's opinion).
2 Id. at 203.

Id. at 205.
4 Id. at 203-04. King was originally accompanied by her union "Chairlady," then, on

another day, by the assistant chairlady. While all three were suspended, only King and the
chairlady were discharged for the attempted representation. The assistant chairlady was
discharged for attempting to grieve the firing of the other two--clearly a violation of section
8(a)(3). See id. at 203-04, 208. For the provisions of section 8(a)(3) see note 39 infra.
5 The other subjects of the complaint, dismissed by the Trial Examiner, related to
discriminatory threats and layoffs. Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. at 202, 210-11 (1972).
6 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972).
1 Id. at 199. For the provisions of this section see text accompanying note 38 infra. The
Act dates back to 1935. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449. The Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, incorporated major revisions to expand the
original Act's coverage to organized labor unions as well as employers. The Act was further
amended by Law of Oct. 22, 1951, ch. 534, 65 Stat. 601; Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519; and Law of July 26, 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395. The amended National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter cited as
N.L.R.A.] is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.
(Supp. 1975).
8 195 N.L.R.B. at 198 (Board's opinion). Unfortunately for the Board's position upon
subsequent judicial review, this statement constituted the only indication of the Board's
statutory reliance in its opinion. See note 97 infra.
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where an employer wishes to conduct an investigatory interview
with an employee, then-as a right under section 7 of the Act 9if the employee has reasonable ground to fear that the interview
will adversely affect his continued employment, or even his working conditions, he may choose to forego it unless he is afforded
the safeguard of his representative's presence.10
Since the employees were fired for trying to exercise this statutory
right, the Board ordered Quality to cease such practices and
reinstate the discharged employees."1 When the Board tried to
enforce this decision in the court of appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
however, enforcement was denied. 12 The Fourth Circuit held that
this new rule could be supported neither by the Act nor by the
13
Board's prior decisions.
A similar unfair labor practice case involved Leura Collins, an
employee of J. Weingarten, Inc., a Texas retail chain store.1 4 When
suspicion arose as to her honesty, she was interrogated privately by
the store manager and a security agent.15 Throughout the interview she asked that some union representative be present, but
these requests were refused on the ground that "this was a private
matter between her and the Company."' 6 Although the questioning eventually exonerated her from a charge of stealing, at the end
of the interview she immediately broke into tears, complaining
"that the only thing she had ever gotten from the store without
paying for it was her free lunch."' 7 This remark led the manager
to reopen the interview.' 8 While other stores in the chain did have
a free lunch policy for employees, and Collins had once worked in
such a store, no such policy was authorized in his store."0 After
' For the provisions of section 7 see text accompanying note 37 infra.
10 195 N.L.R.B. at 198-99 (footnote omitted).
" Id. at 199-200; see id. at 211-12 (Trial Examiner's order).
I
NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1973). Only that portion
of the Board's order pertaining to the assistant chairlady's discharge for attempting to file
grievances was enforced. Id. For the facts of this discharge see note 4 supra.
13 NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1018, 1023-25 (4th Cir. 1973). For an analysis of
the Fourth Circuit's reasoning on this point, see note 97 infra.
" J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446, 446 (1973) (Administrative Law Judge's
opinion).
"I Id. at 448. Around the middle ofJune 1972, Don Hardy, employed by Weingarten as a
"Loss Prevention Specialist," was investigating a complaint that Collins was removing cash
from her register. After two days of observation, however, Hardy found nothing to corroborate this charge, and so informed Store Manager York. Id.
16 Id.; see id. at 446 n.l (Board's opinion).
17Id. at 448 (Administrative Law Judge's opinion).
18 Id.

j9 Id. at 447. "[M]ost if not all" of the workers in Collins' department, including the
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Collins revealed that many employees regularly took free lunches,
steps were taken to halt the practice, but no disciplinary action was
taken against her.2"
The Board, sitting en banc, adopted the findings of the Administrative Law Judge2 1 that this interrogation constituted an unfair labor practice according to the rule established in Quality.22 The
Fifth Circuit, adopting the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit on this
23
issue, denied enforcement of the Board's ruling.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in both
these cases and set them for argument in tandem.2 4 In NLRB v. J.
Weingarten, Inc.,2 5 Justice Brennan, speaking for the majority, reversed the circuit court and held that an employee does have a
statutory right to decline to submit to an interview which reasonably could result in disciplinary action, unless his employer allows
him to be accompanied by a union representative. This right would
be recognized'even if no disciplinary action were subsequently
taken.2 6 While the National Labor Relations Act does not explicitly
grant workers this right, it was held to be inherent in the section 7
right " 'to engage in . . .concerted activities for thepurpose of...
mutual aid or protection.' "27 Since the Board had not exceeded its
powers to "'appl[y] the general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life,' ",28 the case was remanded to the Fifth
department manager, invariably took lu..ch without paying. Id. Collins' revelation of the free
lunch practice understandably astonished her manager. He and Hardy therefore reopened the
interview. Id. at 448. Because of Collins' insistence that her free lunches were a legitimate fringe
benefit, Hardy called his superior, a company vice-president, to obtain confirmation. While this
call was being made, Collins again requested of York that her union steward be present, and
again this was refused. Hardy's telephone call proved inconclusive, so the interview was finally
terminated. Id.
20 Id. at 448-49. Although no discipline seems to have been imposed on Collins, Hardy
had calculated that Collins would have owed the company upwards of $160 for the lunches
she had taken, and prepared a statement to that effect. Collins refused to sign this. Id. at
448.
21 Id. at 446 (Board's opinion). As of August 19, 1972, the title of "Trial Examiner" had
been changed to that of "Administrative Law Judge." See, e.g., Globe-Union, Inc., 199
N.L.R.B. 80, 80 n.1 (1972).
22 J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446, 449 (1973) (Administrative Law Judge's
opinion) (relying on Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052, 1052 (1972), and Quality Mfg. Co.,
195 N.L.R.B. 197, 198-99 (1972)).
23 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d 1135, 1137-38 (5th Cir. 1973). For a more
extensive discussion of the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in this decision see note 98 infra.
24 416 U.S. 969 (1974); 416 U.S. 968 (1974).
25 95 S. Ct. 959 (1975).
26 Id.

at 965-67.

27 Id. at 965 (quoting from N.L.R.A. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970)).
28 95 S. Ct. at 968 (quoting from NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236
(1963)).

1975]

NOTES

Circuit with directions to enforce the Board's order. 29 On the
strength of this holding, the same majority, in InternationalLadies'
Garment Workers' Union v. Quality Manufacturing Co., 30 similarly re-

versed the Fourth Circuit's decision and ordered that the Board's
holding be enforced. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart,
dissented in both cases. 31 He could not envision the Board's rule as
being within the scope of protection intended to be afforded
employees by the Act, 3 2 and would have affirmed the courts of
appeal. Chief Justice Burger also filed a dissent in both cases. 33 He
agreed that the Board had the discretionary power to create such a
new rule, but felt the cases should have been remanded to the
Board for a more extensive explication of the reasons for its
"major change in policy."' 34
The express policy of the National Labor Relations Act is to
promote
the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of
industrial strife and unrest . . . and by restoring equality
of
3 5
bargaining power between employers and employees.

This restoration was effected through federal protection of collective bargaining, thus putting labor on an equal footing with organized management; industrial peace would best result from
negotiations between equals. The keystone, then, of this congressional labor policy is the Act's guarantee of employees' associational
economic rights, 3 n set out in section 7:
29 95 S. Ct. at 969.

30 95 S. Ct. 972, 975 (1975).
31 95 S. Ct. at 969; 95 S. Ct. at 975.
32 95 S. Ct. at 972. Justice Powell's basic position was that an employer's disciplinary.
procedures should be determined solely through the collective bargaining process because what
the Act was designed to protect was this process and not its subject matter. Id. at 970-72.
" Id. at 976. This dissent spoke to both Weingarten and Quality. Id.
34 Id.

35 N.L.R.A. § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). The driving force behind this legislation was
Senator Wagner of New York, who introduced the original bill. F. WITNEY, GOVERNMENT
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 205-06 (1951). See 79 CONG. Rc. 2368-72 (1935). The bill's
passage was spurred in large measure by the collapse of the then-existent national labor
relations administrative scheme (the National Industrial Recovery Act) brought on by A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). F. WITNEY, supra at 206.
For a concise description of the NLRA and the Schechter decision see 1 J. JENKINS, LABOR
LAw § 2.1 (1968). See generally Madden, Origin and Early Years of the National Labor Relations
Act, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 571, 571-73 (1967).

3' See N.L.R.A. § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970):
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce ....
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Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities .... 37

These rights are given effect by section 8 of the Act. Section 8(a)(1)
provides that
[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer. * * to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 .... 38

Specific employer unfair labor practices are elaborated in sections
8(a)(2)-(5).a 9 Because of the breadth of section 8(a)(1), a violation
of any of these other sections will also constitute a "derivative"
violation of 8(a)(1). 4 ° Interference with section 7 rights not covered
by these subsequent specifications is said to be an "independent"
violation of 8(a)(1). 41 Such "independent" violations have traditionally embraced employer interference with employee activities of an
organizational nature such as coercive promises or threats designed
to discourage union membership, election, or other activities; coer-

cive interrogation of employees about their union involvement; or
42
spying on union meetings.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption ....
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to
mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
37 Id. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
38 Id. § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
a9 Id. § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2), prohibits employer domination of unions; id.
§ 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), prohibits "discrimination in regard to . . . any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organizations"; id. § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4), prohibits discrimination against employees who file
unfair labor charges with the Board; and id. § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), prohibits an
employer from "refus[ing] to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees."
40 ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAw,

THE DEVELOPING LABOR

LAw 65-66 (C.

Morris ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Morris]; I J. JENKINS, LABOR LAw § 2.22 (1968). This
concept was accepted by the Board almost from its inception. Morris, supra at 66; see 3
NLRB ANN. REP. 52 (1939).
41 2 J. JENKINS, LABOR LAw § 5.2 (1969); Morris, supra note 40, at 66.

42 See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 608 (1969) (threats); NLRB v.
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Employees have continually asserted a right to union representation during an employer's investigatory interview.4 3 The Board,
however, has been slow to find a coherent statutory basis for such a
right even though it has broad powers to investigate, determine,
and prevent unfair labor practices.4 4
The first case in which this issue came before the Board was
Ross Gear & Tool Co., 4 5 decided in 1945. There an employee was
discharged for insubordination because she refused to meet with
the firm's labor relations supervisor unless the union bargaining
committee, of which she was a member, were present. Although
the supervisor had not revealed beforehand the purpose of the
interview, the Board found that it was about a matter concerning
the -employee's actions partly "in her individual capacity" and
"partly as a member of the union committee." 4 6 Since the company
had previously acknowledged the interest of the union by dealing
with the union committee on this matter, the employee had a right
to require that the company continue to deal with the committee as
a whole.4 7 Therefore, the Board concluded, the discharge based on
the exercise of this right was a discriminatory interference with
union activities in violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3)48
pertaining to discrimination to discourage union membership.
Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1964) (proffer of benefits to influence union
vote); Hendrix Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 100, 104-05 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1963) (surveillance
of union meeting); NLRB v. Bendix Corp. (Research Laboratories Div.), 299 F.2d 308, 309
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 827 (1962) (interrogation as to union sympathies).
"' See, e.g., Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 97, 87 L.R.R.M. 1189, 1190
(1974); Service Technology Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 845, 846 (1972); Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc.,
172 N.L.R.B. 594, 596-97 (1968); Ross Gear & Tool Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1012, 1024-25 (1945).
14 See N.L.R.A. § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970). While the Board has investigatory and
fact-finding powers, its unfair-labor-practice determinations and orders may be enforced
only through suit in the federal courts. id. §§ 10(b)-(m), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(b)-(m).
4
63 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1945).
46 Id. at 1033-34 (Board's opinion); see id. at 1028-29 & n.22. As a union committee
member, Mae Ford had been instrumental in extending smoking privileges in the plant to
women, an accomplishment which gained her the enmity of some of her non-union female
coworkers. Id. at 1021-23. When called in by a supervisor to explain this discord, she
demanded that the entire committee attend the session. Id. at 1028.
11 Id. at 1033-34. In light of the Board's approach to the case, the general question of
employee representation was passed over:
Assuming, without deciding, that an individual employee is not entitled to insist
upon union representation whenever he or she may be called in by management to
be admonished, in the instant case Ford was being called in . . . about a matter
concerning which the respondent had already dealt with [the union] committee as
the exclusive bargaining representative.
Id. (emphasis added).
4s Id. at 1034. For the provisions of these sections see notes 38-39supra and accompanying text.
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That the company considered the discharge to be grounded on
'4 9
"insubordination" was held to be "immaterial.
The Seventh Circuit, however, denied enforcement. 50 The
court held that the Board's decision was "without substantial support."5 1 Its own review of the facts led it to conclude that no union
activities were relevant for the proposed interview, and that the
charge of insubordination was essentially admitted both by the
employee and by union officials. 52 The court further voiced a
policy argument which would be repeated in later employeerepresentation cases:
A decision of this issue favorable to the Board would mean that
any employee could with impunity refuse to comply with a direction by management and in effect abrogate a [discharge-for53
insubordination] rule such as the one here involved.
The issue did not come before the Board again until Dobbs
Houses, Inc. 5 1 was decided nearly twenty years later. In Dobbs, after
deciding that the employee's discharge was not motivated by antiunion discrimination, the Trial Examiner reviewed the Board's
holding in Ross Gear. Noting that the Board had there failed to
reach the question of denial of representation in the absence of
discrimination, he refused to expand the Board's policy. 55 The
49 63 N.L.R.B. at 1034 (Board's opinion). Insubordination can easily be used as a
pretext for discharge in employee-representation cases. See, e.g., Quality Mfg. Co., 195
N.L.R.B. 197, 209 (1972) (Trial Examiner's opinion). Insubordination-by definition-is
"disobedience to constituted authority." BLACK'S L.Aw DICTIONARY 942 (4th ed. 1951).
51 NLRB v. Ross Gear & Tool Co., 158 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1947).
5' Id. at 613. The standard of support "by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole" is the proper standard of judicial review of Board decisions. N.L.R.A.
§ 10(e), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
52 158 F.2d at 613-14. The court concentrated its gaze on the departmental discord
which occasioned the Ford interview without looking to its causal background. Id. at 612.
This analysis gave no weight to Ford's activities in her capacity as union committeewoman. It was
these activities which gave rise to the smoking controversy.
53 Id. at 613 (quoted in NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir.
1973)). See also, e.g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 959, 971 (1975) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("The power to discipline or discharge employees has been recognized uniformly
as one of the elemental prerogatives of management."); Dobbs Houses, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B.
1565, 1571 (1964) (Trial Examiner's opinion) ("An employer undoubtedly has the right to
maintain day-to-day discipline . . . and . . .only exceptional circumstances should warrant
any interference with this right.").
54 145 N.L.R.B. 1565 (1964). A major factor in the lack of Board consideration of the
issue in this interim was the failure of the Board's General Counsel to issue complaints. See
Administrative Rulings of NLRB General Counsel, Case No. SR-2382, 52 L.R.R.M. 1181
(1962); Case No. SR-2245, 52 L.R.R.M. 1083 (1962); Case No. K-71, 37 L.R.R.M. 1076
(1955); Case No. 289, 29 L.R.R.M. 1454 (1952). Arnold Ordman, the General Counsel in
Dobbs, was appointed in 1963. See 142 N.L.R.B. in n.1 (1964).
51 145 N.L.R.B. at 1570-71.
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Board adopted his opinion without comment and dismissed the
56
complaint.
But the Board could not avoid this recurring issue for long
and in the mid-1960's began to formulate a new method of treatment to replace the narrow 8(a)(3) theory of Ross Gear. Since the
subject of an employee's discharge could often form the basis for a
subsequently filed formal grievance, 5 7 and since section 9(a) of the
Act gave unions the right to participate in a hearing on such a
grievance, 58 it would be possible to extend this statutory right to a
pre-discharge investigatory hearing. 59 Since this right would belong to the union rather than to an individual employee, the
abrogation of it would be primarily a refusal to bargain with the
representative, a violation of section 8(a)(5) and only derivatively a
violation of the employee's right.60 In contrast to the Ross Gear
rationale, this'theory would obviate the necessity for considering
whether the cause for discipline was a union-related activity.
At first, the General Counsel and the Board had kept a sharp
distinction between pre-discipline and post-discipline rights, but a
subsequent General Counsel began to argue a new theory: 61 When
a fact-finding interrogation involved "the possibility of disciplinary
action," representation should be required under the Act "because
an 'inchoate' grievance was in the making. ' 62 In 1967, a threemember panel of the Board adopted a modified version of this
rationale in Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Division.6 3
In that case, Gilberto Alaniz, a Texaco employee, was observed
by his foreman to be taking home a can of kerosene and was
immediately suspended pending investigation. Although both
Alaniz and his bargaining representative requested that he be afforded union representation at the investigatory interview, Texaco
denied this request. Prior to the questioning, however, the com56 Id. at 1565.
" See, e.g., S. SLICHTER, J. HEALEY & E. LiVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 651-52 (1960) [hereinafter cited as SLICHTER].

"8 N.L.R.A. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970), allows employees access to their
bargained-for grievance mechanism without using their bargaining representative, but requires that such a representative must have been allowed an "opportunity to be present at
[the] adjustment" of the grievance. This right may, however, be waived by the union. See
Globe-Union, Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1042 (1952).
" Cf Bethlehem Steel Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 341, 343 (1950) (Board's opinion) (union's right
to attend employee's "adjustment" of grievance with foreman).
o See Chevron Oil Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 574, 578 (1967) (Trial Examiner's opinion).
e' See note 54 supra.

6 Chevron Oil Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 574, 578 (1967) (Trial Examiner's opinion) (emphasis
in original).
63 168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967), enforcement denied, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969).
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pany representatives told Alaniz that if he were unwilling to proceed without representation, the meeting would be called off; but
Alaniz remained, answered questions, and eventually signed an
admission. As a result of this admission, he was suspended without
pay for nearly a month."
Since no grievance had been filed, the Trial Examiner had
dismissed both 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) complaints. 65 The Board termed
this approach "too narrow. '66 Reasoning that the meeting was not
merely part of a fact-finding investigation but an attempt by the
company "to provide a 'record' to support [its] disciplinary action,"6 7
the panel held that Texaco's exclusion of union representation
constituted a refusal to bargain, in violation of section 8(a)(5).6"
Since Alaniz had specifically asked that this union right be enforced, Texaco had violated section 8(a)(1). 6 9
Upon appeal, however, the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement. 70 Reviewing the record as a whole, the court found the

evidence "overwhelming" that the questioning was merely investigative and hence should not call for a bargaining representative.71
6" Texaco Inc., Houston Producing Div. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 142, 143-44 (5th Cir.
1969); 168 N.L.R.B. at 361 (Board's opinion).
65 168 N.L.R.B. at 361-62 (Board's opinion).
66 Id.

at 362.

67 Id.

Cf

SLICHTER,

supra note 57, at 625:

The prospect of grievance review of a disciplinary action puts the employer on
notice that he must have evidence to support his charge against an employee.
68 168 N.L.R.B. at 362. For the provisions of section 8(a)(5) see note 39 supra.
69 168 N.L.R.B. at 362. The Board explained:
[I]t is clear that . . . the Company sought to deal directly with Alaniz concerning
matters affecting his terms and conditions of employment. Yet, as noted, the
employees.., had selected the Union to deal with the Respondent on such matters
and there is no evidence that either Alaniz-assuming he could have done so-or
the Union had waived to any extent the right of representation ....
Id.
70 Texaco Inc., Houston Producing Div. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 142, 146 (5th Cir. 1969).
71 Id. at 144. The essence of the court's rationale was succinctly stated: "The function of
the interview was to question Alaniz, not to bargain with him." Id. (footnote omitted).
The court viewed the panoply of section 7 rights as restricted to "the right to bargain
collectively through . . . chosen representatives," not looking to the "other mutual aid or
protection" clause. Id.; cf. notes 104-05 infra. The Board had apparently viewed section 7 and
section 8(a)(5) as having equal weight in its decision. See 168 N.L.R.B. at 362. The court's
restricted view of section 7 would comport with a conceptual tying of the section 7 right to
the 8(a)(5) duty. Thus, the Board's position, as presented to the court in Texaco, seems to
have been that the 8(a)(1) violation it had found was derivative, not independent. This being
so, any employee's right to representation would have to hinge on the existence of a
bargaining situation. While such a reading is not obvious from the Board's Texaco opinion, it
was the interpretation presented on petition for enforcement. See 408 F.2d at 144-45. And it was
the interpretation the Board subsequently adopted. See Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197,
198 (1972).
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Even if the company had committed itself before the interview to
some form of disciplinary action, the court envisioned no reason
for requiring the incidents of collective bargaining prior to the
filing of a grievance.7"
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on two cases
which had been subsequently decided by the Board in which the
complaints of denial of representation had been dismissed. In
Chevron Oil Co.,Ta the Board adopted without comment the ruling
of the Trial Examiner, whose decision had been issued prior to the
Board's Texaco opinion. The Trial Examiner reasoned that since
Chevron had made no decision on the need for discipline before
the challenged interviews had taken place, no grounds for a grievance existed at that time. Until management had determined that
discipline would be in order-at which time an "inchoate" grievance would come into being-the right to representation could not
arise. 4 Similarly, injacobe-PearsonFord, Inc. ,75 the Board overruled
the Trial Examiner and dismissed the representation complaint.
Since the fact-finding interview had been scheduled to take place
prior to any management commitment to pursue disciplinary sanctions, 6 the Board followed Chevron and distinguished Texaco on its
facts.

77

72 408 F.2d at 145. In Chevron Oil Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 574, 578 (1967) (Trial Examiner's

opinion) (cited with approval by the Texaco court, 408 F.2d at 144-45), the Board adopted
for the first time the disciplinary-investigatory distinction. This distinction was reinforced in
the Board's decision in jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594, 594-95 (1968) (Board's
opinion, reversing Trial Examiner's decision on this issue) (cited with approval by the Texaco
court, 408 F.2d at 145).
13 168 N.L.R.B. 574 (1967).
11 Id. at 578-79 (Trial Examiner's opinion). To the General Counsel's contention that an
"inchoate" grievance existed, the Trial Examiner countered:
[A] grievance in the statutory sense does not arise unless and until a management
decision has been formulated to affect adversely an employee's wages, hours, or
other terms and conditions of employment, and the decision is on the brink of
implementation.
Id. at 578. Since the Chevron fact situation indicated that the interviewer had no power to
discipline the employees involved, the Trial Examiner concluded that no imminent threat of
change-and hence no duty to bargain-could have existed at the interviews. Id.
75 172 N.L.R.B. 594, 594-95 (1968) (Board's opinion).
Ild. When called into the office for questioning about his previous day's work refusal,
the employee, a union member, demanded to be accompanied by a union representative. Id.
at 596 (Trial Examiner's opinion). The company's refusal resulted in an impasse which culminated in a strike by all department employees, and the scheduled interview never took place. Id.
at 598.
The company maintained that no decision to impose discipline had been reached, but
the Trial Examiner found strong evidence to the contrary. Id. at 600.
It is noteworthy that the employee's coworkers were so apprehensive about the proposed
interview that they unanimously voted to strike in support of his position. Id. at 598.
17 Id. at 594-95 & n.5. The Board, as in Chevron, noted that the proposed interviewer
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Approving of the Board's modified rule in Chevron and
Jacobe-Pearson,the Fifth Circuit saw no reason to distinguish Texaco,
and concluded:
[S]ince the interview dealt only with eliciting facts and not with
the consequences of the facts revealed, its subject matter was not
within the scope of compulsory collective bargaining. 7
While the Board did not, in subsequent cases, acquiesce in the
Fifth Circuit's refusal to distinguish Texaco from Jacobe-Pearson, its
decisions in all these cases-prior to its application of the Quality
rule-reached the same result: dismissal of the denial-ofrepresentation complaints. 79 Moreover, the right promised in Texaco
became more and more circumscribed. 80
Then, in Quality, the Board broached a new method of
analysis. Even though the Trial Examiner specifically found that
there had been no refusal to bargain with the union-and hence
no 8(a)(5) violation-King's discharge represented the denial of
her section 7 "right to engage in a protected activity." 8 1 This was
82
thus an independent, non-derivative violation of section 8(a)(1).
was not authorized to discharge employees, id. at 594 n.4, and concluded: "The 'potential'
for disciplinary action was remote and the purpose of the meeting essentially for the
gathering of information." Id. at 595.
78 408 F.2d at 145 (footnote omitted).
71 See cases cited note 80 infra. But see Emerson Elec. Co., U.S. Elec. Motors Div;, 185
N.L.R.B. 346, 348 (1970) (Member Jenkins, concurring).
" It was established in later Board decisions that (1) the employee must have "reasonable grounds for believing" that discipline "was imminent or ... probable," Dayton Typographic Serv., Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 357, 361 (1969); see, e.g., Southwestern Pipe, Inc., 179
N.L.R.B. 364, 380 (1969); (2) the employee-not his union-must request representation, see
Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 491, 492 (1971) (applied to 8(a)(1) but not
8(a)(5) violation); (3) no representation was needed for "every routine interview," Wald Mfg.
Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 839, 846 (1969), enforced on other grounds, 426 F.2d 1328 (6th Cir. 1970);
see Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Sales Terminal, 179 N.L.R.B. 976, 983-84 (1969); (4) insubordinate insistence on representation would go unprotected, see, e.g., American Beef Packers,
Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 875, 882-83 (1972); (5) company policy of conducting interrogations by
persons not empowered to impose discipline or of withholding decisions until after interviews would foreclose the application of Texaco, see, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 192 N.L.R.B.
834, 836 (1971) (no authority to discipline); Wald Mfg. Co., supra at 846 (decision after
interview); (6) an employee may be denied the representation of a union steward who is also
the subject of the investigation, see, e.g., Service Technology Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 845, 845
n.1 (1972); (7) a disciplinary interrogation will be classed as "investigatory" if there is an
underlying purpose of further fact-finding, for example, the location of valuable stolen
merchandise, Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp., supra at 493-94; and (8) because an
employer has reasonable doubt as to the union's majority status, the Texaco rule will not be
applied, see United Aircraft Corp., 179 N.L.R.B. 935, 937-38 (1969), enforced, 440 F.2d
85, 100 (2d Cir. 1971).
Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 210 (1972) (Trial Examiner's opinion).
92 For a discussion of the independent-derivative distinction see text accompanying
notes 40-42 supra.

1975]

NOTES

525

Accompanying this shift in concentration from the union's rights to
the individual employee's rights was a change in the test for when
this section 7 right would arise: An employee's statutory right
should not depend on management's subjective intentions.8 3 Instead, an objective test was formulated: reasonable fear by the
8 4
employee that the interview could adversely result in discipline.
Since this is the employee's right, it would be under his control.
The right could only come into being at his request and would be
waived if he raised no timely objection at the interview.8 5 While the
Board's new test made reference to an employee's fear of a change
in "working conditions," a clarification properly narrowed the
scope of the rule's intent:
We would not apply the rule to such run-of-the-mill shop-floor
conversations as, for example, the giving of instructions or training or needed corrections of work techniques. In such cases
there cannot normally be any reasonable basis for an employee
to fear that any adverse impact may result from the interview
86

The objective standard of "reasonableness" was the foundation of
the Board's new test; thus the disciplinary-investigatory dichotomy
was not relevant to the determination of this independent 8(a)(1)
8 7
violation.
83

The Board and the courts have in the past rejected tests based on employees' subjective

motivations or fears. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 608 (1969); B.M.C.
Mfg. Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 823, 825 n.8 (1955) (Board's opinion).
84 Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 198-99 (1972) (Board's opinion). Cf. Dayton
Typographic Serv., Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 357, 361 (1969) (Trial Examiner's opinion) (quoted in
note 80 supra). The objective nature of such a test has been strongly questioned by Board
Member Kennedy. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052, 1053-56 (1972) (dissenting
opinion); Quality Mfg. Co., supra at 200-01 (dissenting opinion). But see id. at 198 n.3
(majority opinion), where the majority of the Board panel explained:" 'Reasonable ground' will
of course be measured . . . by objective standards under all the circumstances of the case."
(Emphasis added.) In point of fact, the National Labor Relations Act itself, to choose but one
facet of law, mandates "reasonable grounds" tests. See N.L.R.A. §§ 8(a)(3)(A), (B), 10(l), 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3)(A), (B), 160(l) (1970).
8 See 195 N.L.R.B. at 198-99. The Board did not hold that there was an absolute right
to representation, but merely that no discipline could be threatened or imposed for requesting such representation. That the employee must exercise this right only by making his request
before or during the interview was clarified in a later case. See Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B.
1052, 1052 n.2 (1972).
On the other hand, if the employer refused to allow union representation at an
investigatory interview, he would have to end the interview immediately and could proceed
to act on information otherwise obtained. 195 N.L.R.B. at 199.
88 195 N.L.R.B. at 199.
87 The Board's opinion in Quality made no such distinction and indeed couched its
reasoning specifically within the context of the hitherto untouchable investigatory interview.
See 195 N.L.R.B. at 198; cf. Chevron Oil Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 574, 578 (1967) (Trial Examiner's opinion). But see, e.g., Western Elec. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 84 L.R.R.M. 1041, 1042
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The power of the Quality test was soon demonstrated in Mobil
Oil Corp.,88 where the Board reversed the Trial Examiner's pre89
Quality dismissal of the denial-of-representation complaint.
Likewise, in National Can Corp.,90 a Board panel affirmed the Trial
Examiner's finding of an 8(a)(1) violation under the Quality rule. 9 1
Then, Weingarten extended the rationale of Quality to a situation
where no disciplinary measures were taken against the interviewed
employee, 9 2 a result impossible under the Texaco rule. The
employer's continuation of questioning after denying the
93
employee's request for representation alone violated the Act.
Had the company's refusal of a representative been immediately
followed by termination of the interview without discipline, its
actions would have met with Board approval. 94 On the other hand,
(1973) (Member Penello, concurring) (disciplinary-investigatory distinction should be maintained).
88 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972) (three-member panel). This case concerned a company
investigation into employee theft, which eventually resulted in the suspension or discharge
of six employees and the exoneration of two. Id. at 1057-59 (Trial Examiner's opinion).
19 Id. at 1052. The Trial Examiner reasoned that while union representation had been
denied at employee interrogations, the company had made no decision as to discipline prior
to the interviews, and, in addition, the questioning was conducted by security agents who
had no disciplinary powers. Id. at 1060 (Trial Examiner's opinion). The Board panel, to the
contrary, noted that two of the questioned employees had asked for union representation as
soon as they had discovered the nature of Mobil's investigation. Therefore, citing Quality, the
panel found an 8(a)(l) violation. Id. at 1052 & n.3 (Board's opinion).
This decision went further than Quality. inasmuch as in Mobil, the discharges complained
of were not grounded upon the employees' insistence on union representation as in Quality,
but were dearly for cause. Compare id. at 1059 & n.4 (Trial Examiner's opinion) with Quality
Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 198 (1972) (Board's opinion). The Board explained its decision
with the following rationale:
[I]t is a serious violation of the employee's individual right to engage in concerted
activity by seeking the assistance of his statutory representative if the employer
denies the employee's request and compels the employee to appear unassisted at an
interview which may put his job security in jeopardy. Such a dilution of the
employee's right to act collectively to protect his job interests is, in our view,
unwarranted interference with his right to insist on concerted protection, rather
than individual self-protection, against possible adverse employer action.
196 N.L.R.B. at 1052.
90 200 N.L.R.B. 1116 (1972) (three-member panel). In this case a union shop steward
was discharged because he insisted on representing a coworker at a disciplinary meeting. Id.
at 1118 (Trial Examiner's opinion).
91 Id. at 1116 (Board's opinion). The Trial Examiner had found an 8(a)(l) violation,
under Quality and, in addition, an 8(a)(3) violation, since the discharged employee was acting
in his capacity as a union steward. Id. at 1123 (Trial Examiner's opinion).
92 J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446, 449 (1973) (Administrative Law Judge's
opinion); see note 20 supra and accompanying text. In so doing, the Administrative Law
Judge relied on the rationale expressed in the Mobil Oil case and quoted in note 89 supra.
202 N.L.R.B. at 449.
9 See 202 N.L.R.B. at 449 (Administrative Law Judge's opinion).
'4 See, e.g., Western Elec. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1973) (Board's opinion) (no violations
because interviews were terminated upon employees' requests for union representation).
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a threat of disciplinary reprisals used to enforce an employee's
attendance at a non-represented interview would not be approved. 95
In establishing the existence and scope of this new section 7
right in these cases, however, the Board offered little explanation
of or reasoning for its departure from the Texaco rule. 96 Iris not
surprising, then, that the circuit court opinions denying enforcement to Quality9 7 and Weingarten98 made no clear distinction between the incidents of the Texaco rule and the requirements of the
Quality rule. Although 'the Seventh Circuit in Mobil Oil Corp. v.
NLRB 9 9 did recognize that the Board had made such a distinction,
it maintained that the new rule proposed by the Board was outside
of the "historical context and the central purpose" of section 7.00
With this the Weingarten Court disagreed:
9 See, e.g., New York Tel. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 180, 83 L.R.R.M. 1353 (1973).
96 NLRB v.J. Weingarten, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 959, 976 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1018, 1025 (4th Cir. 1973); Comment, Union Presence
in Disciplinary Meetings, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 333 (1974).
In addition, the Board developed a split of opinion over the Quality rule. See, e.g., J.
Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446, 446 n.2 (1973). Board Member Kennedy initially
dissented from the Board's ruling in Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 200 (1972). He has
since steadfastly maintained his position. See, e.g., Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B.
No. 97, 87 L.R.R.M. 1189, 1190 (1974) (three-member panel, concurring opinion); Mobil Oil
Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052, 1053-56 (1972) (three-member panel, dissenting opinion).
Similarly, Member Penello, since his appointment, has also adhered to the modified
Texaco rule. See, e.g., Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. No. 97, 87 L.R.R.M. 1189,
1190 (concurring opinion); Western Elec. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 84 L.R.R.M. 1041, 1042
(1973) (three-member panel, concurring opinion).
See also Western Elec. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 80 L.R.R.M. 1705, 1707 (1972)
(Members Kennedy & Penello constitute majority of three-member panel).
91 NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1018, 1025 (4th Cir. 1973), enforcing in part and
denying enforcement in part to 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972). The Fourth Circuit enforced only that
part of the Board's decision which found illegal the discharge of the assistant chairlady for
attempting to file grievances. 481 F.2d at 1021. For the facts of this case see note 4 supra.
In denying enforcement to the balance of the Board's Quality decision, the court held
impermissible the Board's distinguishing of the Texaco-rule cases and noted the paucity of
explanations in the Board's opinion. 481 F.2d at 1024-25. It concluded by branding the
Board's decision an attempt "to alter or rearrange employer-employee relations to suit its
every whim." Id. at 1025.
9s NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d 1135, 1138 (5th Cir.), denying enforcement to
202 N.L.R.B. 446 (1973). The Fifth Circuit, which had previously denied enforcement in
Texaco, specifically described that decision as "binding precedent." 485 F.2d at 1137. It noted
the denial of enforcement of the other Quality-rule cases, and proceeded to determine that
[w]hile a basic purpose of section 7 is to allow employees to engage in concerted
activities for their mutual aid and protection, such a need does not arise at an investigatory interview.
Id. at 1138 (emphasis added). This statement was later criticized by the Supreme Court. See
note 113 infra and accompanying text.
99 482 F.2d 842, 844-46 (7th Cir. 1973), denying enforcement to 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972).
100482 F.2d at 846. While the court did allow that the language of section 7 was broad
on its face, it felt that the circuit court decisions of Ross Gear and Texaco, the strong
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The Board's holding is a permissible construction of "concerted activities . . .for mutual aid of [sic] protection" by the
agency charged by Congress with enforcement of the Act, and
should have been sustained. 01'

After reviewing the scope of the Quality rule, 10 2 the Court pointed
out that the rule comported with the Act "even though the
employee alone may have an immediate stake in the outcome" of
the investigation.' 0 3 The presence of a union representative at an
investigatory interview constitutes "an assurance to other
employees . . . that they too can obtain his aid and protection if

called upon to attend a like interview,"' 10

4

and was analogized to a

collective-bargaining emphasis of section 7, and "history" belied the contention that any
authority other than that of the Board could support the Quality rule. Id. at 846-48. For this
reason, it held the Board's rulings to be impermissible statutory constructions; for
[i]f the Board's interpretation of §§ 7 and 8(a)(1) correctly reflected the will of
Congress, we are persuaded that this interpretation would have been recognized
many years ago.
Id. at 848. Yet, in denying the Act's protection to a right which admittedly came within the
literal wording of section 7, the Seventh Circuit classed an employee's right to representation
at an interview by which he may well be fired with
such unprotected activity as mutiny (Southern Steamship Co. v. N.L.R.B., 316 U.S. 31
(1942)), participation in a violent sitdown strike (N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939)), engagement in a breach-of-contract strike (N.L.R.B. v.
Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939)), and disparagement of the employer's product
in circumstances akin to physical sabotage (N.L.R.B. v. Local No. 1229, I.B.E.W., 346
U.S. 464 (1953)) ....
Brief for Petitioner at 22, Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Quality Mfg. Co., 95 S. Ct. 972
(1975) (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842, 846 n.l 1 (7th Cir. 1973)) (citation
omitted).
101 NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 959, 965 (1975) (quoting from N.L.R.A. § 7,
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970)).
102 95 S.Ct. at 963-65. One of the aspects of the Court's review is derived
from none of
the Board's decisions:
[T]he employer has no duty to bargain with any union representative who may be
permitted to attend the investigatory interview .... The Board thus adhered to its
decisions distinguishing between disciplinary and investigatory interviews, imposing
a mandatory affirmative obligation to meet with the union representative only in
the case of the disciplinary interview.
Id. at 965. This point was established only by the General Counsel for the Board in his brief.
Brief for NLRB at 22, NLRB v.J. Weingarten, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 959 (1975) (quoted in 95 S. Ct. at
965). See also note 129 infra.
103 95 S. Ct. at 965.
104 Id. The Court noted that the union representative would play a major role in
overseeing disciplinary procedures to prevent the accretive growth of arbitrariness in managerial disciplinary decisions. Id. & n.6. One commentator has argued that since "[a] slow
accretion of custom and practice may come to control the handling of disciplinary
disputes"-certainly a subject of collective bargaining-the bargaining representative has a
central interest, if not a duty, to exercise vigilance. Comment, supra note 96, at 338. Such
oversight becomes crucial in the light of possible future arbitration:
Evidence of custom and past practice may be introduced [in an arbitration hearing]
to support allegations that clear language of the written contract has been
amended .....
F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKs 389 (3d ed. 1973).
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spontaneous walkout of employees to protest the treatment of one
of their fellows.' 0 5 The union steward's presence at such an interview is thus a direct representation of the interests of all
employees; a demand for his assistance is a demand for collective
assistance. Furthermore, since the underlying purpose of the Act
was "to eliminate the 'inequality of bargaining power between
employees .. .and employers,' "106 to rule otherwise would be to
perpetuate rather than " 'to redress the perceived imbalance of
economic power between labor and management.' "107 The worker
who is interrogated by organized management-particularly without the emotional support of his fellows--"may be too fearful or
inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being investigated, or
Thus, it has been argued, an investigatory interview is an appropriate forum for
invoking the theory of "constructive concerted activities." Comment, supra note 96, at
336-38. Under this doctrine, concerted activity-required under section 7-may be discerned even in the actions of a single employee, "even when acting solely for his personal
benefit, if he is attempting to implement [contractual] rights collectively formulated." Comment, Constructive Concerted Activity and Individual Rights: The Northern Metal-Interboro Split,
121 U. PA. L. REV. 152, 158 (1972) (footnote omitted); see, e.g., NLRB v. Northern Metal
Co., 440 F.2d 881, 887-88 (3d Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion); NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 500 (2d Cir. 1967); Bunney Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 1516,
1519 (1962) (Board's opinion).
This doctrine, however, presupposes a contested interpretation of a specific contract
term. See Comment, supra note 96, at 337. If, for example, the meaning of the contract as to
interview situations has been well established to the effect that representation may be
denied, the employee will not benefit from this theory. Cf Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 63 Lab. Arb.
968, 981 (1974).
10595 S. Ct. at 965 (citing NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130
F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1942)). In Peter Cailler Kohler, Judge Learned Hand presented this
classic analysis:
When all the other workmen in a shop make common cause with a fellow workman
•. .and go out on strike in his support, they engage in a "concerted activity" for
"mutual aid or protection," although the aggrieved workman is the only one of
them who has any immediate stake in the outcome. The rest know that by their
action each one of them assures himself, in case his turn ever comes, of the support
of the one whom they are all then helping; and the solidarity so established is
"mutual aid" in the most literal sense, as nobody doubts.
130 F.2d at 505-06. But cf. Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594 (1968) (discussed at
note 76 supra and accompanying text). "Solidarity" implies concertedness, and is of direct
interest to all- employees who may ever be subject to managerial discipline. The union
steward's presence at the interview is representative, then, of not only the interviewee but all
his coworkers as well, and "he fulfills the same role that the employees themselves fulfill in a
walkout or other protest." Comment, supra note 96, at 340.
Even though the analogy is not perfect in that representation occurs prior to the
action-imposition of discipline-which would precipitate a walkout, representation "is correspondingly less disruptive than the latter forms of concerted activity." Id. In this sense, an
employer's grant of union representation at an investigatory interview could forestall such
work stoppages and thus redound to his own benefit. Id.
10695 S. Ct. at 966 (quoting from N.L.R.A. § 1,29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)).
10195 S.Ct. at 966 (quoting from American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316
(1965)).
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too ignorant to raise extenuating factors."'' 08 A chosen representative would presumably have the understanding and power of articulation not only to bring out relevant facts and extenuating
circumstances on behalf of the employee, but also to aid the
employer by clarifying the issues involved. 10 9 Deferring this
needed representation until after an employee has suffered the
"'economic capital punishment' "110 of discharge would overly
burden the employee's case."' Moreover, the Court took notice of
recent developments in industrial surveillance techniques. Faced
with management's increased powers in this regard, the employee's
"'need for experienced assistance'" would only increase. 1 12 Since
the Board, with its "cumulative experience in dealing with labormanagement relations"-and not a reviewing court-is best qualified to determine the extent of an employee's need for representation, the Board has the power to devise a balanced remedy which is
not in conflict with the Act." 3 Finally, argued the Court, the right
to representation conferred by Quality "is in full harmony with
actual industrial practice'1 4 as exemplified by current trends in
collective bargaining.1 6Recently, contract provisions" 5 as well as
arbitration decisions
have recognized a right to representation.
108 95 S. Ct. at 966.
109 Id. & n.7.
110 0. PHELPS, DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN THE UNIONIZED FiRM 28 (1959). Because

not only immediate income but sometimes substantial accrued benefits, such as seniority, sick
leave, or vacation time, may be involved, discharge is the heaviest industrial penalty an
employee is subject to. See, e.g., F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 621

(3d ed. 1973).
"1 95 S. Ct. at 966-67. The Court explained:
At that point . . . it becomes increasingly difficult for the employee to vindicate
himself, and the value of representation is correspondingly diminished. The
employer may then be more concerned with justifying his actions than reexamining them.
Id. at 967.
112 Id. at 967 n. 10 (quoting from Brief for NLRB at 27 n.22, NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 959 (1975)).
113 95 S. Ct. at 968. Justice Brennan sharply criticized the Fifth Circuit's decision below:
The responsibility to adapt the Act to changing patterns of industrial life is
entrusted to the Board. The Court of Appeals impermissibly encroached upon the
Board's function in determining for itself that an employee has no "need" for union
assistance at an investigatory interview.. . . It is the province of the Board, not the
courts, to determine whether or not the "need" exists ....
Id. For the Fifth Circuit's ruling on this point see note 98 supra.
114 95 S. Ct. at 968.
"' See, e.g., I BNA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 2 1:22
(General Motors Corp. and Auto Workers, 76a); l id. 27:6 (Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
and Rubber Workers, art. V(5)).
116 See, e.g., Universal Oil Prods. Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 832, 836 (1973) (past practice);
Chevron Chem. Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 1066, 1071 (1973) ("a well-established current of arbitral
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In sum, then, since the Board's construction of section 7 as propounded in Quality and expanded in Weingarten was a reasonable
accommodation to employees' needs as intensified by recent industrial practice, and since this construction was not prohibited by
"the language or tenor of the Act,"' 1t 7 it would easily pass the test
of " 'limited judicial review.' "118
Chief Justice Burger disagreed. Pointing out that the Board
had not explained the rationale for its new interpretation in its
decisions but had left that task to the General Counsel on appeal,
he would have sent both cases back to the Board for further
explanation "so that it may enlighten us as to the reasons for this
marked change in policy."1 1 9 Although he agreed that the Board
could exercise discretion in evolving new policy, he felt that the
record gave insufficient indication of whether that discretion had
been abused, and thus accused the majority of rubberstamping
1 20
administrative decisions.
Even stronger objections were voiced by Justices Powell and
Stewart. They would hold that the Board exceeded its discretion.
Failing to perceive the Board's arrival at the Quality rule as embodying "a logical 'evolutionary approach,' "121 Justice Powell accused the Board of "turn[ing] its back on" its own precedent and
the intent of Congress.1 22 Section 7, he suggested, was "for the
most part" aimed only at ensuring the strength of the collective
authority"); Thrifty Drug Stores Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 1253, 1260-62 (1968) (interview results
unreliable, analogy drawn to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Arcrods Co., 39 Lab.
Arb. 784, 788 (1962) (reasonable grounds to fear discipline); Braniff Airways, Inc., 27 Lab.
Arb. 892, 899-900 (1957) (alternative holding) (grievance existed because "discipline might
result").
Contra, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 63 Lab. Arb. 968, 981 (1974) (union failed to achieve
inclusion of representation clause in collective bargaining agreement); E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 646, 651 (1957) (contracted right of representation to arise only
upon filing of written grievance).
1 95 S. Ct. at 968. Had this not been the case, explained the Court, it would be
improper judicial review for any court " 'to stand aside and rubber stamp' " such a decisibn.
Id. (quoting from NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965)). The majority opinion justified
its support of the Board's new ruling in Qualiy on the grounds that (a) the Act's language did
not prohibit such a construction and (b) the primary responsibility for balancing such policy
questions is the Board's. 95 S. Ct. at 968; see, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177,
194 (1941).
Il 95 S. Ct. at 968 (quoting from NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96
(1957)).
119 95 S. Ct. at 976 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
120 Id. (citing NLRB v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 443-44 (1965)). Cf. note 117
supra.
12, 95 S. Ct. at 970 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting from id. at 967 (majority opinion)).
122 Id. at 970.
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bargaining process.1 23 Failing a specific statutory command to the
contrary, management's "free[dom] to discharge employees at will"
should be subject only to limitations arrived at through this collective bargaining process. 12 4 The fact that employee representation is
often-as the majority had noted-the subject of contractual or
arbitral agreement, he concluded, was only a further suggestion
"that union representation at investigatory interviews is a 'mnatter
12 5
that Congress left to the bargaining process."'
The Court, in Weingarten and Quality, has taken a great stride
in recognizing a statutory right of an employee to have a union
12 7
representative 1 26 in an interview which could result in discipline.
And yet a discrepancy exists in the Court's decision; what is
given-in dictum-with one hand is taken away-likewise in
dictum-by the other. In justifying the Board's new construction of
section 7, the Court conducted a lengthy exegesis into the crucial
123

Id. at 971. The dissenting Justices took note of the recent decision of Emporium

Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 95 S. Ct. 977 (1975), wherein
the Court thus described employees' section 7 rights:
These are, for the most part, collective rights, rights to act in concert with one's
fellow employees; they are protected not for their own sake but as an instrument of
the national labor policy of minimizing industrial strife "by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining."
Id. at 984 (quoting from N.L.R.A. § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)).
124 95 S. Ct. at 971.
125 Id. at 972. The dissenters explained:
[T]he nature and amount of information required [by any given employer] for
determining the appropriateness of disciplinary action may vary with the severity of
the possible sanction and the complexity of the problem ...
This variety and complexity necessarily calls for flexible and creative adjustment.
Id. at 971. Such a field of variation among employers with differing needs, they believed,
should call for individually bargained-for responses-not a nationwide federal rule. Id. at
971-72.
12' All of the Board's decisions to date in this field have involved circumstances where
there was a union present to provide representation. Justice Powell, at least, has contended
in Weingarten that the Quality rule should allow for representation by any other employee of
the interviewee's choice in the absence of a recognized bargaining agent. Id. at 969 &
n. I. One commentator on this question, following the analogy to representation in the
grievance mechanism, points out the possibility of allowing any desired person to provide
representation as long as he were not also a representative of a "rival union." Brodie, Union
Representation and the DisciplinaryInterview, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1, 46-47 (1973). See
also id. at 10.
127 It could be argued that the Court has not overstepped established caselaw in
upholding the Board's new section 7 interpretation. Cf NLRB v. Washington Aluminum
Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (spontaneous walkout of nonunionized employees to protest lack of
heat held protected); NLRB v. Century Broadcasting Corp., 419 F.2d 771, 780 (8th Cir.
1969) (actions of sole union member at company held protected concerted activity); NLRB V.
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948)
(insurance salesmen on individual contracts who drafted letter to company suggesting an
appointment for supervisory vacancy held protected).
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role such a representative should fill. 2 " On the other hand, the
majority opinion stated that " '[t]he employer . . . is free to insist
that he is only interested . . . in hearing the employee's own
account of the matter under investigation.' "129 Such dicta led Justice Powell to observe that this limited the protection of Quality to
"the privilege to insist on the mute and inactive presence of a
fellow employee.11 3 0 Such a result was contemplated by neither the
Court nor the Board.
What the Board did in Quality, in contrast to its prior decisions
in such cases as Ross Gear and Texaco, was to apply a new method of
analysis based on section 7 rights. Whereas earlier tests concentrated on organizational rights-the employee's union activities in
Ross Gear and the union's role in adjusting grievances in Texacothe Quality analysis looked directly to the concerted interests of the
128 95 S. Ct. at 965-66 & n.7. The representative furnishes "aid and protection" to the
interviewee. Id. at 965. Although "his presence need not transform the interview into an
adversary contest," id. at 966, he would be able
"to clarify the issues . . . to bring out the facts and the policies concerned . . . to
give assistance to employees who may lack the ability to express themselves in their
cases, and who, when their livelihood is at stake, might in fact need the more
experienced kind of counsel which their union steward might represent."
Id. n.7 (quoting from Independent Lock Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 744,746 (1958)). The Court went on
to indicate that the steward will use discretion more appropriate to his capacity as a union official
than as a mere coworker:
"The procedure ... contemplates that the steward will exercise his responsibility and authority to discourage grievances where the action on the part of management appears to be justified ....
The presence of the union steward is regarded as a
factor conducive to the avoidance of formal grievances through the medium of
discussion and presuasion [sic] .... It is entirely logical that the steward will employ
his office . .. so as to limit formal grievances to those which involve differences of
substantial merit."
95 S. Ct. at 966 n.7 (quoting from Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 647, 651 (undated)).
129 95 S. Ct. at 965 (quoting from Brief for NLRB at 22, NLRB v.J. Weingarten, Inc., 95S.
Ct. 959 (1975)). This argument was accepted by the Court to emphasize the fact that the type of
interview covered by the Quality rule was not a bargaining situation as found in Texaco. See note
102 supra. As support for this contention, the General Counsel relied upon the following
passage from the Board's opinion in Mobil:
[W]e are not giving the Union any particular rights with respect to predisciplinary
discussions which it otherwise was not able to secure during collective-bargaining
negotiations.
196 N.L.R.B. at 1052 n.3 (quoted in Brief for NLRB, supra at 22).
Such a reading of Mobil's dicta is questionable. There, the Board had proceeded to
clarify its quoted statement:
The Employer is still free to impose disciplinary suspension or discharge without
the presence of the Union if such disciplinary actions are made without a prior discussion
or consultation with the affected employee.
196 N.L.R.B. at 1052 n.3 (emphasis added). Thus the contention raised by the General
Counsel, relying on a quotation out of context, lacks support from any decision of the
Board.
131 95 S. Ct. at 971 n.5.
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interviewee and his coworkers. In so doing, a new definition was
formulated for a "disciplinary interview": not when a grievable
decision was made, but when an employee needed the help of his
fellows. A reasonable fear of discipline was sufficient to trigger the
Act's protection; thus the Quality test is far broader than that of
Texaco. But under Texaco, the union's duty was clear: a duty to
bargain over a grievance. Under the Quality rule, however, neither
the Board nor the Court has spelled out the rights or duties of the
union at such an interview. The lack of clear guidelines can only lead
3
to confusion and discord between union and management.1 1
Aside from the argument that section 9(a) of the Act allows the
right of active union participation at the interview,1 3 2 the union representative has the duty-not merely the right-to participate actively, grounded on the union's "duty to provide assistance to an
employee who has invoked his section 7 rights."1 3 3 This duty is part
of a union's general duty of fair representation, which itself is
derived from section 7.134 Such "assistance" would clearly comport
with the description of the representative's role given by the Court
in Weingarten. Until the Board further clarifies the statutory authorization for the employee representative's active participation,
the Court's decision in Weingarten can only be viewed as "of limited
value to the employee or to the stabilization of labor relations
' 35
generally."'
On the other hand, certain criticisms of the Quality rule seem
largely ill-founded. The mere fact that the Board has arrived at a
reasonable rule after pursuing a convoluted decisional history
should not detract from that rule's validity; as Justice Frankfurter
131 For example, under the Court's opinion, an employer could justifiably discharge a
union steward for attempting to speak for an employee under investigation. On the other
hand, a steward could be fired for acting as if the interview were a grievance-adjustment
session. With hindsight as the only rule, no prospective guide to action may be formulated.
Labor relations discord would necessarily result.
M"See, e.g., Comment, supra note 96, at 340-43, 348-49. This argument looks
to subsequent grievance of any discipline imposed. Even if grievance rights do not accrue to
the union during the meeting in question, the union, it is contended, should have access to
the factual background of the employer's actions which it may later be called upon to grieve.
Such access is needed to build an effective case. See id. at 341.
133 Id. at 348.
134 See id. at 347-48. The modern duty of fair representation is based on the union's
duty to refrain from "restrain[ing] or coerc[ing] ... employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7," outlined in N.L.R.A. § 8(b)(l)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970).
See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 184-86 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172, 180
(2d Cir. 1963). See also Crenshaw v. Allied Chem. Corp., 387 F. Supp. 594, 598-600 (E.D. Va.
1975); Cox, The Duty of FairRepresentation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957).
135 95 S. Ct. at 971 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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so aptly noted: "Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought
36
not to reject it merely because it comes late."'
The Board's interpretation of the Quality rule, as expanded in
Weingarten, clearly comes within the language of section 7: "concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection."13 7 The language of the clause itself further
indicates that while Congress may have intended primarily to protect labor unions and the collective bargaining process, 13 other
means of allowing for the exercise of "mutual protection" were not
to be foreclosed by the Act. That the Quality rule appears in
bargained contracts or arbitral decisions should not detract from its
status as a statutory right. Other rights clearly granted by the Act
are also embraced by contract.' 3 9
The "genius" of the National Labor Relations Act, one commentator has noted, "lay in its scope and generality,"1 40 yet labor
law is a field peopled with individuals. One of Congress' foremost
objectives in passing the Act-to strengthen "[t]he relative weakness of the isolated wage earner caught in the complex of modern
industrialism"14t'-is, as the Court in Weingarten and Quality recognizes, peculiarly applicable to the case of the lone interviewee faced
with serious economic reprisal.
Paul H. Ambos
136 Henslee v.

Union Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949)

(dissenting opinion).
137N.L.R.A. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) (emphasis added).
13' See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 95
S. Ct. 977, 984 (1975); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937);
N.L.R.A. § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970); S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4, 8 (1935).
"I See generally Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional
Problems, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 68-80 (1957). The rationale of such a practice was thus
explained to the Supreme Court:
The substance of the statutory right may be enhanced by particularized contractual
definition of its scope .. .and incorporation of the statutory right into the contract
performs the important function of eliminating debate as to its existence by the
people on the factory floor who know their contract if not the law. . . . Thus,
discrimination because of union membership or nonmembership is prohibited by
40 percent of contracts, but it can hardly be suggested that the right which the
contract protects is therefore not statutory.
Brief for Petitioner at 27, Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Quality Mfg. Co., 95 S. Ct.
972 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
1402 J. JENKINS, LABOR LAW § 4.8 (1969).
141S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935). This purpose could well be even
stronger in today's industrial life:
In our increasingly dependent society, in the context of an employment situation in
which collective action is the norm, it seems to be an anomaly to see the individual
not merely standing alone, but being forced to stand alone on matters intimately
related to his or her economic existence.
Brodie, supra note 126, at 49.

